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Origins and Pathways of Agricultural Demonstration in Lesotho, Southern Africa, 1924–1960s

CHRISTOPHER CONZ

In 1924 the agricultural department in Lesotho, southern Africa, launched a demonstration program whereby local men performed rural outreach. Studies of agricultural demonstration in Africa and elsewhere have focused on the ways colonial and segregationist states deployed knowledge and policy via demonstrators to control people and landscapes. This article complicates this important position by arguing that the problems and possibilities of agricultural demonstration, which today remains central to agrarian policy in many countries, must be situated at the intersection of political, economic, and ecological processes operating across multiple scales. This story involves agricultural networks in the British Empire and the American South, and focuses especially on farmers, demonstrators, and politicians in Lesotho and South Africa. Most importantly, local narratives from mountainous Lesotho show that the location of demonstrations, the identity of the demonstrators, and their changing priorities and approaches were key factors in determining how these programs unfolded.

ON A SEPTEMBER MORNING IN 1952, twenty men sat chatting in the chief's courtyard at Mashai Village in the Qacha's Nek district of Lesotho.¹ The chief had called the men to introduce Mokhafisi Kena, the new agricultural demonstrator. Just twenty-seven years old, Kena dismounted from his horse, wearing a pressed uniform. He spoke in Sesotho about home gardening: "You can plant peach trees and grow spinach and carrots in front of your house, your wife won't spend long days searching for wild greens anymore ... schools across Lesotho cultivate gardens where children learn by practical work, and eat fresh produce." Kena believed that gardening, as part of a package of agri-

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cultural knowledge, could enrich the standard diet of *papa* (maize porridge), greens, milk, and occasional meat while improving rural living standards.²

The discussion then turned to nutrition, a topic that highlighted diverging perspectives on food, agriculture, and history. Kena explained that people, especially children, should eat more meat, beans, and eggs for protein to prevent malnutrition. Suddenly a man protested: "It's not about wanting meat, it's because there is no meat these days ... we Basotho ate meat long before the whites came ... you are a madman!" Kena apologized and rephrased his point: "True, poverty is deep and food is short, but it is also true in our custom that children don't eat eggs, that elders eat meat before we feed our children, and we focus on quantity of cattle, not quality. I am asking you to change this." The meeting continued with Kena addressing concerns about the upcoming plowing season. That afternoon, Kena visited people in their fields and corrals, also speaking to schoolchildren. In the morning Kena rode to other villages to teach farmers about new seeds, tools, and veterinary medicines and to discuss practices for managing livestock, croplands, and households.³

Kena's predecessors began demonstration work in 1924, when Basutoland's Department of Agriculture (BDA), under colonial governance, launched the initiative. As a British High Commission territory surrounded by South Africa, Basutoland's politics, economy, and agricultural policies were closely intertwined with its much larger neighbor. Recent scholarship has shown that agricultural education and demonstration in South Africa must be understood as part of a segregationist political project. The South African state sought to keep Africans in rural areas and out of cities when they were not working labor contracts—an imperative that was supported by British colonial policy.⁴

This article affirms this important perspective while making three overlapping claims. First, the ideas and practices of agricultural demonstration in Basutoland must be situated at the intersection of political, economic, and ecological processes operating on multiple scales. The BDA employed men like Kena to circulate certain knowledge among rural farmers, thereby carrying out colonial policies that were entangled with international capitalism, industrial and missionary education, and soil and nutrition sciences. In the regional context, most Basotho farmers had limited land and capital, and farmed part-time in conjunction with wage work in South Africa. Colonial agricultural initiatives accommodated this situation, but also offered some opportunities to subvert it. Lesotho's story also has important connections to agricultural outreach in South Africa and the American South of the early 1900s. As scholars have pointed out for South Africa and the United States, it

was the segregationist political economy that created the conditions of poverty that agricultural demonstration sought to mitigate. While this is accurate, I argue that demonstration work, which today remains a core part of agricultural policy in many African countries, must be understood for the ways varied ideas came together in specific places. This approach offers a fuller picture of how these programs functioned and malfunctioned in the past.⁵

Secondly, scholars of Lesotho have rightfully criticized the agricultural interventions of colonial and postcolonial governments for implementing schemes that misunderstood or ignored local realities.⁶ Studies of agricultural demonstration and extension in Africa have focused primarily on the ways in which states have deployed knowledge and policy via people like Kena to assert control over rural people and landscapes: to rationalize them into healthy, hardworking subjects by promoting commercial production and soil conservation. Less clear in this literature is how local political actors, both African and European, participated in making these programs. This article focuses on the Qacha's Nek district of Lesotho to argue that the places where demonstrators operated, who demonstrators were, and how their priorities and approaches in their work changed over time were key factors in how these programs unfolded. This history offers a glimpse of how politicians, demonstrators, and farmers processed and applied new knowledge to remake environments and livelihoods.⁷

Finally, in Basutoland, as in other places in colonial Africa, India, and the American South, most farmers could not afford to adopt new practices. Local variables of social order, politics, and ecology conditioned who had access to which knowledge, as did the ways agricultural policies and demonstration services changed over time. Especially in later years, Basotho who already owned land, animals, and equipment were the recipients of material and educational support, a policy that failed poorer farmers. Women, despite being central to African agricultural systems, were excluded from most farming demonstrations until the later 1950s. Exclusion, whether by gender, education, poverty, or geographic location, thus becomes a central theme, in addition to the ways knowledge circulated.⁸

The period from 1924 to the 1960s was an important time for the evolution of agricultural practice and policy in Lesotho, but an overview of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is important to set the context. The Basotho nation was born when Chief Moshoeshoe protected various chieftainships following a period of turbulence and migration in southern Africa in the 1820s.




Figure 1. Lesotho: Topography and Points of Interest. Map created by Kira Sullivan-Wiley, Department of Earth and Environment, Boston University.

In 1833 Moshoeshoe welcomed missionaries from the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society (PEMS), with whom he developed relationships. Between the 1840s and 1860s, the Basotho fought several wars with the Dutch-descended Boer settlers from the neighboring Orange Free State and, in the process, were dispossessed of their best arable lands. In 1868 Moshoeshoe considered his options, and Basutoland became a British protectorate. Basotho relations with the Crown were tumultuous, especially during wars from 1879 to 1884. By the early 1900s, the Basotho had established a working relationship with the British, within which a hierarchy of chiefs descended from King Moshoeshoe played an essential yet subordinate role. At the head of this hierarchy was the paramount chief (PC), a direct descendant of Moshoeshoe.⁹

After prospectors discovered diamonds (1867) and gold (1884) in South Africa, some Basotho prospered by exporting grain to the new markets and working in the mines. Basotho farmers had adopted ox-drawn plows from the French missionaries, along with wheat and other crops, and applied these technologies in commercial production. Cheap grain from overseas and high duties on Basotho goods, however, drastically reduced Basotho exports by 1890. In the 1890s rinderpest devastated livestock, while drought and locusts hindered agriculture. In this ecological context, Basotho men migrated to South African mines and farms in greater numbers, seeking cash to reinvest

in livestock and farm equipment, to pay colonial taxes, and to buy guns for defense. By the early 1900s, however, Lesotho was transitioning from grain exporter to labor reserve for South African industry, a system in which migrants and their families farmed part-time.¹⁰

With mineral production booming, the government of the Union of South Africa, formed in 1910, sought to modernize its agricultural sector under a system of white land ownership. The Land Act (1913), which built on earlier segregationist policies, undergirded this effort by prohibiting Africans from owning land outside reserves and from sharecropping with white farmers. In a system that had dominated production in the areas surrounding Lesotho, many Basotho had negotiated sharing agreements or worked for wages. Once the Union government began subsidizing irrigation equipment and land for white farmers, life on white-owned farms became more precarious for non-whites, forcing many African families onto reserves within the Union or into Basutoland. As Lesotho's population swelled, many migrants settled in the Maloti, the eastern mountain region (Figure 1).¹¹

Basotho and other groups migrated from surrounding lowlands into the Maloti around 1880, permanently settling, cultivating, and grazing these areas for the first time. To survive in the higher, colder environment, men and women adopted new cultivars and technologies in addition to older ones. An early settler in the 1880s, Chief Lelingoana, for example, used ox-drawn plows to sow non-native wheat and peas in places where the frost-free growing season was too short for indigenous sorghum, or even maize. Apart from the plowing, women did much of the agricultural labor. They cultivated, harvested, and processed cereals, beans, pumpkins, and melons, while collecting wild greens and roots for food and medicine. In addition to plants, people raised cattle for meat, milk, skins, and manure. As the central cultural and economic resource, cattle were transferred in marriage, slaughtered at funerals, and harnessed for draft power.¹²

But sheep, not cattle, were the animals that linked mountain producers directly to international markets. The colonial government, in conjunction with chiefs, wealthier stockowners, and European traders, began encouraging merino wool production in the 1880s. These efforts displaced the more ecologically appropriate and nutritionally valuable fat-tail sheep. Vegetation change and soil erosion, due in part to new settlement and land use in the Maloti, were evident by the early 1900s. To conserve verdant grasses, people practiced various rotational grazing systems based on seasonality. For soil fertility, farmers fallowed older fields and opened up new fields when one became exhausted,

but this system became less tenable under new political, ecological, and demographic constraints.¹³

In the Qacha's Nek administrative district, established in 1888 by the government, thirty-seven thousand people lived, farmed, and reared livestock by 1911. In that year, roughly one-third of the district's five thousand families owned a single-share plow. Other families cultivated small plots with hoes. Farmers broadcasted seed before turning it into the earth. Planting in rows was uncommon. Farming was a social process that linked relatives, friends, and chiefs in a web of relationships where everyone contributed. Someone offered oxen, another owned the plow, while others worked. Perhaps an elderly man or widow offered fields. Boys and girls participated as laborers and as students learning essential agricultural knowledge from their elders. Participants earned a share of the harvest or cooked food. Who was available to work when, who owned the implements, and who owned the land depended on many factors, including the migrant labor system.¹⁴

The political economy of migrant labor and population growth contributed to agrarian changes that put new stress on the Sesotho land tenure system. In this system, local chiefs allocated usufruct rights to fields for each married man. In the 1920s most married men owned fields. From plowing season through harvest, these fields were the exclusive property of the owner, but upon completion of the harvest, the local chief opened the fields for common grazing. Generally speaking, Basotho designated land in three main categories: village, cultivated fields, and commonage. In the 1920s people produced food using fields and commonage mostly, though some animals grazed in villages. There were few fruit trees in the mountains then, and home vegetable gardens were virtually unknown.¹⁵

Against this backdrop, important changes in agriculture, education, and politics at international and local scales shaped how Basutoland established its demonstration program in 1924. British colonial agricultural departments had been doing rural outreach since before 1900 from Borneo to the Gold Coast. British officers, not local people as in Lesotho, performed this work in most territories until the 1930s. Early British outreach aimed to boost production of such cash crops as cocoa, cotton, and tobacco, but the 1920s saw a partial shift toward farmers' needs. Although the case of Lesotho has important parallels and connections to British-led programs elsewhere, it is also distinct. As I highlight in this article, archival evidence shows that Lesotho's relationships with South African politics and agriculture, including agricultural education, created a different experience with outreach, even as the BDA promoted ex-

port production of wool, mohair, and wheat.¹⁶

The South African government produced and disseminated agricultural knowledge, mostly to support white farmers. Agricultural colleges for whites began experimenting and publishing results around 1900. Working with the Transkei Native Council, the Union government also established several schools for “Natives.” Located near the city of Umtata, Tsolo Agricultural College began in 1908 as an “agricultural institution” where Europeans trained African apprentices, in addition to conducting on-site demonstrations in, for example, cotton cultivation. In 1913 the Transkei Council supported an initiative for Tsolo to train black students in “scientific agriculture” so that graduates could return home to work as demonstrators. The school began training African demonstrators in 1920.¹⁷

White agricultural colleges trained students for industrial farming, while the black colleges aimed to create yeomen farmers who could produce market commodities and food for subsistence. Planners in the Native Affairs Department and some African leaders believed that, by learning and applying specific techniques, African yeomen would develop in designated reserves. Segregationists and later architects of apartheid insisted that Africans were rural people who could improve themselves through agriculture and small-scale industry like carpentry, rather than in the alien spaces of European cities. The fact that land was limited in the reserves, as in Basutoland, served the needs of industrial capital because most farmers, no matter how skilled, would still be partially dependent on wage labor. In other words, people could apply their knowledge and labor in their fields and gardens to produce food that essentially subsidized the very South African industries that paid them below living wages. Agricultural colleges, in this way, supported the Union agenda by maintaining a political economy in which blacks remained subordinate to white capital.¹⁸

But for many Basotho and Africans in the Union, the concept of improvement, or progress, had a deeper history that complicates how we understand education, work, and farming within colonial political economies. Basotho history had been about confronting historical challenges by adapting to political, cultural, and ecological changes. King Moshoeshe had migrated to modern day Lesotho from the north, finding new environments to expand his influence. During the 1800s, Moshoeshe and his followers used older forms of social organization in conjunction with new technologies. They rode on non-native horses and used European-made firearms to defend themselves. Farmers hitched steel plows to oxen to sow maize and wheat in a process that

bound non-native technologies and crops to African practices and ecologies, allowing some people to settle new mountain environments. To some, progress meant earning cash by exporting agricultural commodities, working for wages, or converting to Christianity.¹⁹

Missionaries and their converts could not claim a monopoly over progress, but Christians were important in sculpting its meaning as it applied to the world in which demonstrators worked from the 1920s. For Lesotho's missionaries, progress meant learning Enlightenment ideals and biblical teachings about morality and piety. A person should apply their knowledge of science and reason to activities such as agriculture to advance toward civilization and, eventually, salvation. Proponents of this view believed that African knowledge and practice in agriculture, animal husbandry, and religion were haphazard, careless, and ineffective. This view failed to recognize existing African practices of experimenting, producing, and using new knowledge to manipulate nature in ways that served diverse needs.²⁰

Jobo Moteane, a Mosotho PEMS minister, established the first mission in Qacha's Nek in 1893. He taught Christians that achieving material prosperity would please God, a view that manifested in new building styles and market enterprise such as wool production. In their schools, PEMS had emphasized literacy since their beginnings in Lesotho, focusing on the Bible. PEMS also established an industrial school in the 1880s where students learned carpentry, stonecutting, and blacksmithing, but not agriculture. PEMS was instrumental in creating a small but influential class of educated people, called *batsoelopele* (progressives). By the 1920s *batsoelopele* had seized opportunities in commerce, agriculture, and politics at local and national levels.²¹

PEMS was the only church in Qacha's Nek before the Roman Catholics founded Hermitage Mission in 1921. French priests from the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI) had established Lesotho's first Catholic mission in 1862. Although OMI was slow to Africanize its leadership, Catholics had asserted a larger presence in the mountains by the 1930s. The Catholic emphasis on vocational skills, including agriculture, may have gained them favor with highlanders. The French transferred control of the Lesotho mission to the Canadian OMI in 1930. In 1933 a priest named Joseph Bonhomme became bishop of Lesotho and aggressively expanded Catholic missions in the mountains. Patriarchal in their approach, Catholics offered agricultural education for men and homemaking skills like sewing, cooking, and gardening for women. Bonhomme's initiative was part of a social action program that had been developed in South Africa by Father Bernard Huss. As an educator,

Huss promoted agriculture as the key to social uplift. He had taught on mission farms and in villages since the 1910s, lecturing in Basutoland and writing African-language textbooks on agriculture.²²

The ideas about progress resonating from these Christian clergies and congregations shaped the perspectives of political leaders who advocated agricultural demonstration as a response to ecological changes. Following drought in 1919, a South African government commission declared that “deterioration of the veld and soil erosion were national dangers.” Therefore, the state needed to improve irrigation, afforest eroded areas, and improve agricultural education. The report stimulated new ecological and political concern for Lesotho, where the Maloti cradled the headwaters of the Orange River, a vital water source for South Africa. The Basutoland government had begun small-scale soil conservation in 1903, expanding efforts when Lawrence Wachter became Basutoland’s first agricultural officer in 1911. But the Drought Commission’s findings in 1923 demanded new state interventions, including agricultural demonstration.²³

While South Africa urged agrarian reforms in Lesotho for their own reasons, Basotho political leaders asserted themselves too. Created in 1903 by the British resident commissioner (RC), the Basutoland National Council (BNC) was composed mostly of Basotho chiefs and served as an advisory body to the RC’s administration. The BNC’s powers were limited, but its members debated and advocated for state support of agriculture, soil conservation, and education. By 1924, the BNC had become an important forum for discussing environmental interventions. For instance, some chiefs, as large stockowners themselves, supported sheep dipping and burweed eradication efforts as ways to bolster wool production. Others rejected these policies, arguing that they overburdened stockowners and common Basotho.²⁴ Outside the BNC, a group called the Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) argued that improving smallholder agriculture through formal education could alleviate poverty. The BPA, founded in 1907 by educated Basotho Protestants, aimed to advance “important matters relating to the prosperity and progress of all Basotho.” Knowledge, wrote one BPA member, “could blaze a trail out of poverty” when applied appropriately. Backing this view, BPA member Labane Chokobane spoke at a public meeting in 1924 to insist on agricultural education, including demonstration services.²⁵

The progressive philosophy of the BPA and some chiefs regarding industrial and agricultural education had important transatlantic dimensions. Scholars have begun exploring these links, but have focused mostly on political

questions rather than agriculture.²⁶ Booker T. Washington of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama believed that improved knowledge of industry and agriculture could lift African Americans from poverty. In Basutoland, Protestant missionaries had established an industrial school at Leloaleng in 1880 with similar objectives in mind. In 1898 Paramount Chief Lerotholi had advocated for an industrial school in Maseru modeled in part on Tuskegee. When it opened in 1906, the school offered students two-year courses in carpentry, stonemasonry, and blacksmithing, but there was no agricultural course. Nor was agriculture always central at Tuskegee. When George Washington Carver arrived in 1896 to develop the agricultural department there, he sought to transform black sharecroppers into self-sufficient yeomen by imparting agroecological knowledge about soil, manure, and crop varieties. This transformation, Carver believed, could improve the lives of black farmers even in the face of white supremacy and consequent land dispossession.²⁷

Carver developed a “farmer’s college on wheels” to circulate this knowledge among farmers. The Jesup Agricultural Wagon, a mule-drawn cart that carried a one-horse plow and harrow, garden tools, and a butter churn, symbolized the possibilities and problems of the Negro Cooperative Demonstration Service. Thomas Campbell, the first black demonstrator in the US Department of Agriculture, who operated the wagon in 1906, recalled that some things were inappropriate for poor farmers, most of whom sharecropped on white-owned cotton lands and had little choice in what they sowed.²⁸ To create an independent yeomanry, moreover, was considered subversive in a place where white prosperity depended on cotton monoculture and the subjugation of black labor. Carver’s demonstration model did not directly address the injustices that kept black farmers in poverty. But in the early 1900s, Carver developed low-tech, ecologically sustainable agriculture, and his innovative “college on wheels” approach was taken up far from Alabama.²⁹

Evidence suggests that this demonstration model traveled to southern Africa with the Baptist missionary James East and the South African Davidson Jabavu. The son of former slaves, East grew up farming cotton in Alabama and may have learned from Tuskegee demonstrations. The young Baptist arrived in the Ciskei territory of South Africa in 1909. East condemned racial inequality, especially the inadequate farmland in the reserves, but like his missionary colleagues, he also believed that “the natives did not seem to possess even the most elementary knowledge of farming or homemaking.”³⁰ In tandem with his preaching, East carried implements by wagon to demonstrate, for instance, how to plow using horses. His wife accompanied him, teaching

women horticulture, canning, and cooking. He eventually linked up with Fort Hare Native College in 1918 to create an agricultural program, along with a local farmers association. At Fort Hare, East collaborated with Davidson Jabavu, the son of an African newspaper editor and a career educator. After completing his studies in England, Jabavu had visited Tuskegee to study their agricultural curriculum for use in South Africa, returning home in 1915.³¹

In 1918, the South African Department of Agriculture hired James East as the first government demonstrator in the Ciskei. East considered himself an “agricultural missionary.” In contrast to the 1901 Tuskegee expedition to German Togoland to help Africans increase cotton production at the expense of growing food, East was most concerned with food. “The only way I can meet our Lord’s injunction ‘Give ye them to eat,’” he reported, was “to show them how to plow so as to get food.”³²

In Basutoland, the British-trained agricultural officer Lawrence Wachter embraced this philosophy, as he did the BPA’s desire for demonstration as a way to increase export and subsistence production. Although the resident commissioner agreed, especially with the move to increase commercial wool and wheat production by applying new knowledge, he hesitated to commit financial support. Basutoland’s agricultural budget in the 1920s was meager and drawn from a hut tax and a wool export duty. But Wachter and his supporters in the BNC persisted. Wachter toured agricultural colleges in the Transkei and Ciskei in March 1924, a trip that shaped his original plan for demonstration work in Basutoland more than did the established model for rural outreach in other British territories.³³ At Tsolo Agricultural College, Wachter saw livestock grazing school paddocks and fenced-off plots of maize, groundnuts, and sorghum. The European faculty, he was told, aimed to “teach natives to be better farmers on their own land” and to train demonstrators for work in rural areas. Wachter was particularly impressed with Fort Hare, where East and Jabavu had collaborated. He lauded the curriculum in which students spent their second year putting theory into practice by growing beans, maize, and potatoes. He also praised Fort Hare’s mission for rural outreach using African demonstrators.³⁴

Wachter shared his report with an excited BNC, and their renewed request compelled the resident commissioner to allocate a tiny budget of £250 to start the program. BNC members insisted that qualified Basotho be hired as soon as they could be trained. They believed that farmers were more likely to respect formally educated men who also understood the social and ecological experience of farming in Lesotho.³⁵ Edwin Moletsane, a graduate of Tsolo,

began work in September 1924 as Lesotho's first demonstrator. Highlighting his Sesotho language, Moletsane stressed that "explaining the work to people in their mother tongue they understand it quicker." In 1925 three demonstrators were stationed in Lesotho, reflecting the shoestring budget. By 1960 forty-three Basotho demonstrators worked across nine districts with help from two hundred five assistant demonstrators.³⁶

In the early years of the program, demonstrators tried to encourage low-tech practical changes in agriculture for as many people as possible. The BDA promoted this knowledge to strengthen market production of wheat and wool and to diversify household food supplies. Methods resembled the institute model from the United States and the Transkei, in which demonstrators lectured farmers, who gathered at administrative centers or missions, rather than working in small villages. Demonstrators recorded how many lectures they gave and how many people attended. At these bases, demonstrators also cultivated plots to show new methods. For instance, Elias Magadlela, a native of Qacha's Nek and the district's first demonstrator, began work in 1926, when crops suffered from cutworm. Rather than recommending insecticides, Magadlela taught farmers to plow winter soil to kill cutworm larvae by exposing them to frost, an agroecological approach that characterized these early years.³⁷

Demonstrators also showed farmers the benefits of husbandry based on animals, trees, soils, and manure. This body of knowledge, proponents believed, could produce stronger crops while preserving soil fertility and stability. This knowledge was not entirely new to Basotho, who did have seasonal systems for conserving pastures and building materials around villages. But few people used, or could afford to use, manure as fertilizer. Households, particularly in the mountains, required plentiful heating and cooking fuel, especially in the winter. With few trees, people dried cattle dung for fuel. Afforesting the grassland, in theory, would allow people to use firewood instead, freeing up manure for use in gardens and fields. However, people also used dung to build and insulate houses. For some, manuring fields required too much labor. Others owned no cattle and simply gathered droppings around the village.³⁸

Whereas few Basotho fertilized with manure, many adopted vegetable gardens, which were central to early demonstration work and remained popular throughout the program. Prior to the 1930s, most households included a reed enclosure at the front for cooking and eating, but people did not cultivate food plants there. Demonstrators like Magadlela taught people how to construct garden spaces with peach trees framing plots of spinach, carrots, and



Figure 2. Home Garden, Ha Makhaola, Qacha's Nek, Lesotho. Photo by author, December 2014.

other vegetables (See Figure 2). In 1936 three demonstrators supervised one hundred ten household and school gardens in Qacha's Nek, up 40 percent from 1935. By 1961 the government reported that Basotho across the territory managed twenty-one thousand home gardens.³⁹ Demonstrators also encouraged communal gardens where women managed plots cooperatively by sharing materials, tools, and seeds. Basotho women adapted local practices of reciprocal labor to cultivate new and old plants while remaking domestic spaces.⁴⁰

Home gardens and winter crops, however, were not popular with all Basotho. The issues surrounding these new practices show how various people grappled with these changes. Most livestock lived at mountain grazing posts during summer, but during winter, animals grazed in and around villages on local grass and crop residues. Unattended animals devoured unfenced gardens. Demonstrators also encouraged winter crops such as peas and wheat, which posed new challenges. When people finished harvesting maize, beans, and sorghum in late autumn, the chief announced that fields were open for common grazing until plowing the following spring. Farmers who planted winter crops or cultivated gardens found themselves in conflict with stockow-

ners, who expected to pasture their animals on residues. The BNC eventually debated the matter in 1947 and supported a law making the gardener responsible for fencing. As for winter crops, stockowners were required to keep animals away. The BNC's slow response and its decisions show that, while rearing livestock remained central, officials and villagers validated new uses of village and field spaces.⁴¹

In addition to the low-tech methods, demonstrators taught that capitalist production was important for self-improvement, and new biological resources, commercial fertilizers, and implements featured in these lessons. In the mid-1920s the BDA sold imported seed to farmers via European traders. Demonstrators were charged with explaining to farmers how to select and sow, for example, drought resistant maize like Wisconsin Dent or American wheat varieties. In one fertilizer experiment in 1926, a demonstrator planted a half acre in potatoes, to which he gave "a liberal dressing of kraal manure and 200 lbs. of superphosphates."⁴²

Along with crops, demonstrators supported wool as Basutoland's primary export, which served the economic interests of large stockowners, chiefs, and traders more than common Basotho. To expand production, the government had subsidized merino ram services for stockowners since the early 1900s. Simultaneously, scab had infested flocks since 1903 and continued until the early 1930s. Demonstrators worked with veterinary staff to enforce regulations for both anti-scab dipping and breeding programs designed to eliminate local fat-tail sheep.⁴³ Emasculation campaigns and prohibition of bastard rams became law in the early 1900s, and demonstrators helped enforce this prohibition. Some Basotho, particularly poorer people who owned few animals and produced no wool, hid these sheep from inspectors. They preferred fat-tails for their ample meat, ritual value, and heartiness in mountain environments. That people hid these animals suggests that some Basotho resented demonstrators interfering with stock keeping.⁴⁴

Just as people protested the elimination of fat-tail sheep, most farmers could not meet the technical and economic demands of these new agricultural packages. Intensive plowing in the winter, for wheat or to combat cutworm, proved difficult because many plowmen worked in South Africa for most of the year. From the 1920s into the 1960s, on average, some 40 percent of Basotho men were working in South Africa. Nor was it only a problem of human muscle. In winter months, some oxen would be too weak to break the crusty soil to destroy cutworm.⁴⁵ Like stud ram services, commercial seed cost money. The same was true of phosphate fertilizers recommended for optimal

yields of imported seed. Government census figures showed increased sales of harrows, planters, plows, and fertilizers, yet still relatively few people could afford to buy them. Mining, the main wage employment for prospective buyers of these items, paid an average of £3 per month in 1936. This low wage denied most families these tools and assured that men would come back to work the mines, rather than subsist on farm production alone. Given this predicament, people short on animals, land, or equipment may have dismissed demonstrators' advice to use costly inputs.⁴⁶

Shifts in agricultural policy and demonstration priorities in the 1930s and 1940s came from an intersection of ecological change, scientific trends, and politics. In 1932–1933 a catastrophic drought in southern Africa desiccated crops, killed livestock, and dried up springs. In subsequent reports, colonial economists and ecologists argued that soil erosion posed the greatest threat to Lesotho's people and environment. Many Basotho agreed. In a broader context, economic depression and the American Dustbowl stimulated international research on soil erosion and conservation.⁴⁷

For the British and South African governments, erosion formed the biggest obstacle to economic development in Basutoland, African reserves, and overseas colonies. Some insisted that careless African practices were accelerating erosion and silting the region's rivers. To address these concerns in South African reserves, the Department of Native Affairs launched "betterment" schemes that included soil conservation, livestock culling, and relocations, all of which were deeply unpopular.⁴⁸ In Basutoland, the government obtained a grant from the British Colonial Development Fund (CDF) in 1936, with which it created a soil erosion office to implement conservation schemes over the next twenty years. The office had its own staff who, with legions of Basotho men and women, built an extensive network of furrows, grass strips, and other structures.⁴⁹

Government bureaucrats, soil experts, and laborers did not act alone. Demonstrators played a significant role by continuing to encourage practical changes like plowing on the contour, manuring, and tree planting. But demonstrators, along with European agricultural officers, also regulated farming practices with new vigor. In 1941 the paramount chief signed Order 1/26, which created a legal framework for soil conservation. The order established regulations for constructing and maintaining strips, terraces, and drainage furrows. The BDA, through cooperation with chiefs, now exercised the authority to select sites for conservation structures. Landowners were responsible for maintaining the works in their fields, and under no circumstances were farm-

ers to plow into conservation structures.⁵⁰

The new regulations also aimed to prevent people from plowing virgin lands on steep slopes. As government employees who worked with farmers, demonstrators often measured and determined which lands were suitable for cultivation, which were unsuitable, and which needed buffer strips. This was difficult work at a time when people made “continuous requests for the cultivation of virgin land, while others extend[ed] their existing parcels by cultivating the adjacent grazing areas.”⁵¹ In 1951 a demonstrator in Leribe district named Loko, for example, inspected a slope where the district chief and agricultural officer had previously ordered fifty fields out of production. Loko disagreed and certified that half of the fields could be cultivated once buffer strips were built. He drew the ire of his superiors and some farmers alike, while others appreciated that he saved their fields. Two interviewees who worked in Qacha’s Nek in the 1950s said that, although the work was important, they disliked monitoring soil conservation because of various tensions. They recalled, too, that although farmers resented the loss of acreage to buffer strips, the circulation of conservation knowledge, in addition to the new laws, led many to support the schemes. Still, this regulatory role put new demands on demonstrators’ time and complicated their standing in the communities in which they worked.⁵²

National political actors, too, shaped perspectives on policy changes and demonstration work. *Lekhotla la Bafu* (Council of Commoners, or LLB) was originally founded in 1919. Josiel and Maphutseng Lefela, brothers, formed LLB to advocate for more independence from British governance and a restoration of the traditional chieftainship, which they believed had been coopted for imperial purposes. From his seat in the BNC, Josiel Lefela had supported veterinary and agricultural improvement but had protested compulsory sheep-dipping in the 1920s.⁵³ LLB claimed that South Africa sought to “exterminate, through the agency of poisonous dip, the flocks of the nation.” LLB knew well that South Africa, with British collaboration, sought to annex Basutoland, and they crafted their political statements to promote resistance.⁵⁴

With regard to soil conservation in subsequent decades, LLB argued that the primary objective of the programs was to incorporate Basutoland into the Union. They targeted the ways chiefs compelled people “to plant trees in the dongas” without food rations under a “government hireling working under the Agricultural Department as a Demonstrator.”⁵⁵ While some chiefs used and misused collective tribute labor for their personal benefit and for conservation work such as planting trees, this was not the standard practice.

Although demonstrators did police agricultural activities, hired conservation crews built most structures. Wages on these crews were paltry, especially for women. Furthermore, incorporating Basutoland into the Union had been part of political discourse since the 1800s. But LLB's broad characterization of demonstrators and chiefs as imperial pawns served their contemporary political agenda (however important) more than it reflected a popular rebuke of demonstration or agricultural reforms in the 1930s and 1940s.⁵⁶

As the priorities of demonstrators' work changed, so too did the approaches they used to circulate knowledge. In 1946, with another grant from the CDF, Basutoland launched a ten-year development plan with agriculture and soil conservation as central components. The grant also funded experiment stations for testing crop varieties while expanding a new style of demonstration work. The BDA had concluded that delivering lectures included a "high percentage of unwilling listeners," and that smaller focus groups might yield better results.⁵⁷ Around 1950 demonstrators began selecting farmers to cultivate check plots beside their own plots. The farmer of the check plot might broadcast his seeds, while the demonstrator planted rows and fertilized with manure and phosphates. The farmers and demonstrators then measured the quality and weight of the harvests to validate the new techniques. Other community members watched and compared the results.⁵⁸

Whether showing or telling, the outcomes of demonstration depended on each demonstrator's relationship to the host communities. The case of Mokhafisi Kena illustrates this point. Born in 1925 into a relatively privileged family, Kena grew up in Makhaola Village, a day's ride from Mashai. He attended a local school at Tsoelike Mission while tending his father's livestock, taking the animals to mountain posts during summer. His father was a counselor for Chief Makhaola Lerotholi, the popular district chief who supported most agricultural programs until his death in 1932. Among the first settlers in his village, the elder Kena farmed fertile fields while working as a tax collector, a paid position supervised by chiefs under the colonial system of indirect rule. The younger Kena enlisted in the army in 1943, at age seventeen, serving the British cause in North Africa. This experience, he recalled, earned him respect beyond his age when he returned home.⁵⁹

In 1950 Kena enrolled at Fort Cox Agricultural College in South Africa. Fort Cox had opened in 1930 in the Ciskei. Built for African students, Fort Cox trained agriculturalists for farming and demonstration work. The curriculum included courses in what Kena considered the foundations of scientific agriculture: field and animal husbandry, soil conservation, horticulture, sheep

and wool, bookkeeping, and veterinary science.⁶⁰ Just two years after the National Party initiated apartheid in South Africa, politics was pervasive at Fort Cox. With other students, Kena attended African National Congress meetings at nearby Fort Hare College. While many activists saw the agricultural colleges and the associated demonstration programs as institutional tools for fixing Africans as essentially rural people, and as a subordinate laboring class, others like Kena saw agriculture as a vehicle for upward mobility through self-sufficiency. Like Washington and Carver at Tuskegee, Kena believed that self-sufficiency could also foster political power. He thought that for people willing to apply progressive ideas, small-scale commercial farming offered an alternative to mine labor and could thereby undermine the colonial economy. Kena graduated in 1951, capping an experience that showed him how “professional farming could be profitable, yielding food and money, even in the mountains.” Kena insisted until he died in 2016 that improving agriculture with technology and knowledge would foster political change.⁶¹

The Basutoland government hired Kena after graduation, posting him in Qacha’s Nek. Villagers at Mashai, according to Kena, were impressed with his experience and education. Kena also spoke with a familiar Sesotho accent. People in Mashai knew his family roots and his connections to the late district chief Makhaola, whose son Theko had replaced him. Theko, in fact, had been the village chief at Mashai prior to his father’s death, and like his father, he supported agricultural reforms. On some level, Kena was also a child of Mashai. But Kena met challenges despite his charisma and ability to bridge local and global worlds through his education, identity, and experiences.⁶²

Kena worked within a social order defined by gender, age, work experience, and family background and where people understood history, politics, and opportunities in different ways. The old man who contested Kena indicated that meat had been more abundant in the past, before the “white man” came. Undoubtedly, the man resented the ongoing effort to eliminate mutton sheep in favor of woolen sheep. His concern was well founded. In 1953 the government passed new legislation to renew its commitment to eliminate non-merino sheep and bolster the wool industry, at the expense of nutritious fat-tail mutton. Kena understood this narrative, but he urged farmers to change their practices of farming, stock rearing, and eating in order to deal with these changes in a harsh mountain environment and unjust political climate. In so doing, Kena drew on his own training and experiences and on international nutrition science that had circulated from the new Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) into BDA policies and school curriculums. In this policy

paradigm, malnutrition was explained as a consequence of African practices and soil erosion, not as a function of the political economy of wool, land, and labor. Although Kena tried to bridge different narratives of change, the older man wanted his own knowledge validated first and his social position recognized, especially in the public space of the chief's courtyard. Kena's local origins, political connections, and education, then, only earned him so much authority over knowledge.⁶³

The experiences of ordinary Basotho illustrate the possibilities and pitfalls of agricultural demonstration in the 1950s. Individual narratives show how people interacted with demonstrators, how they processed new knowledge, and how they applied this knowledge in pursuing their livelihoods. Seleso Tsoako was born in the remote Lesobeng area of Qacha's Nek in 1919. He grew up tending his grandfather's sheep and eventually moved closer to the district capital when his father fell ill. He attended Catholic schools there and became a primary school teacher. Tsoako said that his gardens, animals, and fields gave him all the food he needed until he lost his sight recently. He attended agricultural demonstrations in the 1940s and 1950s, sometimes bringing his students along. At one demonstration, he recalled, the audience grew frustrated with a young demonstrator who used English terms like crop rotation and leguminous within his Sesotho explanations.⁶⁴

Since he was a teacher and knew both Sesotho and English, Tsoako prompted the demonstrator to repeat and explain in simple Sesotho. Nonetheless, many people sat confused or left. The demonstrator's credibility suffered because he was young. He then excluded others by using technically specific, sometimes foreign language. Language created a filter through which knowledge circulated, sometimes very slowly or not at all. Technical terms were translated into Sesotho, but the literal translation took time before it conveyed the intended meaning. For instance, crop rotation became *phetolo ea lijalo*, literally, change of crops. Tsoako used his education and linguistic skills to learn about legumes, nitrogen, and crop rotation—knowledge that he applied in productive activities. At ninety-five years of age in 2015, Tsoako was living modestly from a pension and selling eggs to neighbors.⁶⁵

In another narrative, Mamahlomola Makhaola's experience illustrates how gender and geography could shape demonstration outcomes. Born in 1932, she grew up in rural Qacha's Nek, where she completed three years at a tiny Catholic school. There were "no government demonstrations there in those days," she remembered, "but we learned things at school about nutrition and building the body with vegetables ... before that we collected greens in the

mountains without thinking much about it." It was only in the early 1950s, when she moved to her husband's place in Makhaola Village, which was closer to the district capital, that she saw home gardens, fruit trees, and demonstrations.⁶⁶

Makhaola's husband worked in the mines, and she sought better ways to feed herself and her son. Until the late 1950s, she and other women were not invited to the farming demonstrations but still learned things about gardening, poultry, and pigs by word of mouth and through the influence of women's organizations like the Homemakers Association, a self-help group founded by Protestant women in the Transkei of South Africa. In this gendered model, which became popular in rural Lesotho by the 1950s, women learned gardening, canning, sewing, and cooking techniques. As part of its social action programs, the Catholic mission at nearby St. Francis promoted similar activities. Makhaola and other women took pride in canning and drying fruit and in maintaining gardens of vegetables, fruit trees, and herbs.⁶⁷

Mamahlomola Makhaola and Seleso Tsoako processed and applied low-tech knowledge, but the politics of development at local, national, and international levels was moving toward bigger things. Following World War II, colonial governments had tried to modernize commercial agriculture through technology-intensive schemes during what has been termed the "second colonial occupation."⁶⁸ In this vein, the Basutoland government launched the Pilot Project in Berea district in 1953. This scheme was loosely planned as a "miniature TVA." Planners sought to advance from what they saw as the first phase of agricultural development, stabilizing soils and conserving pastures, to the more difficult second phase of improving crop yields.⁶⁹

Demonstrators continued their educational work with farmers and school children within the Pilot Project, but at the project's core, demonstrators helped form tractor groups to cultivate large blocks that cut across individual land allocations. By 1958, the Pilot Project had collapsed for reasons ranging from poor mechanisms for farmers to voice concerns to the nuances of land tenure and topography in Lesotho. Growing anticolonial sentiments underpinned these failures, highlighting the fact that Basotho participation in political processes and agricultural planning and implementation was limited. Two successive mechanization schemes in lowland districts in the early 1960s met similar challenges.⁷⁰

As the Pilot Project ended, the BDA launched a progressive farmer's scheme in 1958 that paralleled similar programs in colonial Malawi and further afield in India. The BDA defined the qualifying characteristics through




Figure 3. “You can plant all of your crops with this planter—maize, beans, monkey fruit, sorghum and others. Be sure that your planter has this symbol on it.” SOURCE: Mochochonono, October 1, 1949. National University of Lesotho Archives. Translated by Professor ‘Madira Thetso, National University of Lesotho.

profiles published in its annual report. For example, the report described an ex-schoolteacher who produced “large numbers of eggs in a home-made incubator” and sold poultry and eggs locally. Progressive farmers, in theory, did not have to be men, as in the case of a woman who for years had “grown and harvested a good crop of peanuts.” Progressive farming in 1958 meant breeding specific animals and cultivating new crops for market. Demonstrators identified those people who matched these characteristics and some registered as progressive farmers.⁷¹

Progressive farmers, as defined and reported by the BDA, were few in the late 1950s. Their ranks grew slowly or not at all. In Berea district, where the Pilot Project was implemented, for instance, they increased from forty-four to eighty-two between 1958 and 1960. As for Qacha’s Nek, the official count sank from thirty-seven to twenty-one, the disparities owing in part to comparatively less focus on arable farming in the mountain areas. In 1960 progressive farmers represented just 0.4 percent of all farmers in Basutoland. This small percentage again raised the question of who could afford to adopt so-called progressive methods.⁷²

The 1960 Basutoland Agricultural Census defined a progressive farmer as someone willing “to improve himself” and possessing “sufficient land, livestock, labour and implements to farm properly.” By 1960 many Basotho had no land, no livestock, or for the poorest, neither. Demonstrators encouraged farmers to purchase, borrow, and share ox-drawn implements to improve yields.⁷³ Although many farmers owned plows, few owned other implements such as harrows, cultivators, and planters like the one advertised in a 1949 Sesotho newspaper, shown in Figure 3. For most people, this planter was too expensive. But the advertisement presented an image of how a farmer could improve his lifestyle and, perhaps, his social standing. To those unable to read the message, or afford the planter, the manufacturer’s illustration appealed to and reinforced common aspirations for many Basotho farmers at that time: to improve one’s livelihood by applying new technology and knowledge in a particular setting.⁷⁴

But there were those who pursued these aspirations in ways that both overlapped and departed from government demonstration in the late 1950s and early 1960s. James Machobane, a Mosotho farmer and innovator, grew up in South Africa and Lesotho, where he learned to farm and herd livestock and attended missionary schools. He believed, like advocates of agricultural education, that knowledge and hard work could lift people from poverty without help from the state. Machobane was deeply concerned about hunger, but he

rejected the government promotion of monoculture, tractors, and fertilizers, which he viewed as ecologically destructive and socially exclusive. So, in the late 1950s, he developed his own farming system to fit Lesotho's social and ecological realities.⁷⁵

Machobane conducted experiments over several years in which he reconfigured knowledge learned from his father, from government initiatives and mission education, and from his personal farming experiences. The result was a scientific mixed-cropping system by which farmers could harvest vegetables, potatoes, and grain throughout the year. He founded the Machobane Agricultural College, at which he trained his own demonstrators to teach his system to male and female villagers. The Machobane system faced fierce opposition from those, both European and African, who insisted on big technical change. His system did gain followers, but although it has enjoyed recent resurgence, its impact was unfortunately limited.⁷⁶

Few people knew of Machobane in mountain settings like Qacha's Nek district, where the push toward mechanization and progressive farming played out differently. Highland initiatives aimed to develop wool and mohair production by standardizing the national flock of merinos and angoras (goats), constructing wool sheds, and building roads.⁷⁷ The more time that demonstrators spent policing livestock and monitoring wool production, the less time they spent teaching what, in the past, qualified as scientific agriculture: manuring, gardening, and crop rotation. For officials, the shift in the meaning of scientific agriculture in Basutoland in the 1950s and early 1960s echoed colonial policies elsewhere in Africa. Whereas earlier demonstrations gave significant attention to food production, most postwar development projects prioritized the production of commodities for export.⁷⁸

Regional and national politics shaped these policies and continued to do so after independence in 1966. To some extent, Basutoland's late-colonial modernization projects paralleled South African betterment schemes that aimed to "rehabilitate" denuded reserves in order to curb African migration to cities.⁷⁹ But Basotho political leaders, despite their opposition to apartheid and colonial rule, also favored modernization schemes over agricultural initiatives that prioritized food production. The two most prominent political parties at independence, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) and Basotho National Party (BNP), both born in the 1950s, differed in their views on the place of chiefs, churches, and South Africa in an independent Lesotho. But both parties believed that commercial agriculture was the future. As for the poorest Basotho, many without land or animals, the trends in government agricultural

policy and demonstration pushed them still further to the margins.⁸⁰

Demonstration remains central to agricultural policy in Lesotho, as it does in many countries. The tensions between commercial development and sustainable farming for food continue to play out as international and local experts, politicians, demonstrators, and farmers debate agricultural priorities and the methods for carrying them out.⁸¹ This history of agricultural demonstration from its inception in 1924 to independence in 1966 shows how varied actors participated, and did not participate, in these programs, which are the antecedents to current government policy and practice. While it is important to understand the ways knowledge and policy were produced and circulated to advance colonial political and economic projects, many of which deepened social inequality along lines of race, class, and gender, we must also grasp how participants interacted with one another and with larger circulations of knowledge. By examining these interactions as part of a longer local historical trajectory, and as the locus where transnational ideas converge, we can draw parallels between different groups of socially marginalized farmers around the world. Finally, the possibilities and problems exposed here foreshadow how postcolonial modernization schemes, and the role of knowledge circulation in those schemes, have benefitted some but not others.⁸²

NOTES

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1. I use *Basutoland* and *Lesotho* interchangeably, although the former was the name for the British territory before independence in 1966. *Basotho* are the people from Lesotho; *Mosotho* is singular. *Sesotho* is the language and culture of the Basotho.

2. Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Jan. 7, 2015. All interviews were conducted by the author in Lesotho with consent from interviewees. All permissions, recordings, and transcripts are held by the author.

3. For example, the nutritional disease pellagra was first reported in 1907. Its incidence increased markedly from 1933 to the 1960s. See *Basutoland Colonial Annual Report for 1935* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1936), 6 (hereafter cited as CAR, with year); *Basutoland Annual Report of the Department of Health for 1962* (Moriya: Morija Printing Works, 1963), 10; Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Jan. 7, 2015; Lawrence Wachter to Government Secretary (GS), Apr. 4, 1929, S3/1/1/8, Lesotho National Archives, Maseru, Lesotho (hereafter cited as LNA).

4. *Basutoland Report of the Department of Agriculture for 1936* (Moriya: Morija Printing Works,

1936), 6–13 (hereafter cited as RDA, with year); Wachter to GS, Sept. 26, 1924, S3/1/1/8, LNA; see also Julia Tischler, “Education and the Agrarian Question in South Africa, c. 1900–40,” *Journal of African History* 57, no. 2 (July 2016): 252–70.

5. See Karen Ferguson, “Caught in No Man’s Land’: The Negro Cooperative Demonstration Service and the Ideology of Booker T. Washington, 1900–1918,” *Agricultural History* 72, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 33–54; Farieda Khan, “Rewriting South Africa’s Conservation History—The Role of the Native Farmers Association,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20, no. 4 (Dec. 1994): 499–516; Judith Kimble, *Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule in Basutoland, 1890–1930*, ed. Helen Kimble (Grahamstown: Rhodes University, 1999); on current outreach policies in Africa, see J. K. Mutimba, “Reflections on Agricultural Extension and Extension Policy in Africa,” *South African Journal of Agricultural Extension* 42, no. 1 (Jan. 2014): 15–26.

6. For the colonial period, see Kate Showers, *Imperial Gullies: Soil Erosion and Conservation in Lesotho* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005); Sandra Wallman, *Take out Hunger: Two Case Studies of Rural Development in Basutoland* (London: Athlone Press, 1969); for the postcolonial period, see James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Aerni-Flessner, “Development, Politics, and the Centralization of State Power in Lesotho, 1960–75,” *Journal of African History* 55, no. 3 (Nov. 2014): 401–21.

7. On demonstration and extension in Africa, see Owen Kalinga, “The Master Farmers’ Scheme in Nyasaland, 1950–1962: A Study of a Failed Attempt to Create a Yeomen Class,” *African Affairs* 92, no. 368 (July 1993): 367–87; Henrietta Moore and Meghan Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890–1990* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1993), 114–21; Eric Green, “A Lasting Story: Conservation and Agricultural Extension Services in Colonial Malawi,” *Journal of African History* 50, no. 2 (July 2009): 247–67; Eric Green, “Labor Costs and the Failed Support of Progressive Farmers in Colonial Malawi,” in *Landscape, Environment, and Technology in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa*, eds. Toyin Falola and Emily Brownell (London: Routledge, 2012), 173–201. My use of individual narratives draws on Nancy Jacobs and Andrew Bank, “Introduction: The Micro-Politics of Knowledge Production in Southern Africa,” *Kronos: Southern African Histories* 41 (Nov. 2015): 11–35.

8. For Africa, see David Anderson, *Eroding the Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya, 1890s–1963* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003); Green, “A Lasting Story”; for India, see Benjamin Siegel, “Modernizing Peasants and Master Farmers’: All-India Crop Competitions and the Politics of Progressive Agriculture in Early Independent India,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 37, no. 1 (May 2017): 64–85; on the American South, see Ferguson, “Caught in No Man’s Land”; Jeannie Whayne, “Black Farmers and the Agricultural Cooperative Extension Service: The Alabama Experience, 1945–1965,” *Agricultural History* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 523–51; Mark Hersey, *My Work is That of Conservation: An Environmental Biography of George Washington Carver* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011).

9. The paramount chief was descended from the eldest son from King Moshoeshoe’s senior wife. This position was hereditary, but it was also contested by Moshoeshoe’s junior sons and manipulated by the colonial government to extend its authority. See L. B. B. J. Machobane, *Government and Change in Lesotho, 1800–1966: A Study of Political Institutions* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1990), 36–42, 76–82; Elizabeth Eldredge, *A South African Kingdom: The Pursuit of Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 50–55.

10. Eldredge, *South African Kingdom*, 159–66, 184–89; Pule Phoofolo, “Face to Face with Famine: The BaSotho and the Rinderpest, 1897–1899,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 29, no. 2 (June 2003): 503–27. By the mid-1930s, the transition from granary to labor reserve was complete. See, for example, Kimble, *Migrant Labour*, 1–5; Colin Murray, *Families Divided: The*

Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 10–14.

11. See Charles Van Onselen, *The Seed is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, A South African Sharecropper, 1894–1985* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996); Timothy Keegan, *Rural Transformations in Industrializing South Africa: The Southern Highveld to 1914* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986).

12. Tiiisetso Pitso, “1909 Court on Settlement in the Mountains,” trans. Stephen Gill, *Leselinyanya la Lesotho*, Oct. 1909, held at Morija Museum and Archives, Morija, Lesotho (hereafter cited as MMA); “Jobo Moteane’s Account of a Journey through the Lesotho Highlands 100 years ago,” ed. and trans. David Ambrose and P. Sekoli, *Mehloli 2*, no. 2 (1990): 8–12; Marshall Clarke, “Unexplored Basutoland,” *Proceedings of the Geographical Society* 10 (1888): 519; see also Robert Germond, *Chronicles of Basutoland: A Running Commentary on the Events of the Years 1830–1902 by the French Protestant Missionaries in Southern Africa* (Morija: Morija Sesuto Book Depot, 1967); Hugh Ashton, *The Basuto* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 30–31, 102, 124.

13. On the growth of wool production in these years, during which exports rose from 1.6 million pounds in 1900 to 13 million in 1929, see CAR 1903, p. 15; CAR 1907, pp. 9, 41; Alan Pim, *Financial and Economic Position of Basutoland: Report of the Commission Appointed by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1935), 190–94; Vernon Sheddick, *Land Tenure in Basutoland* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1954), 76–77.

14. *Basutoland Census, 23rd April, 1911* (Cape Town: Argus Printing Company, 1912), 6–7, 40, 47; Sheddick, *Land Tenure*, 74–76; Edward Makhanya, *The Use of Land Resources for Agriculture in Lesotho* (Roma: University of Lesotho, 1979), 5–10.

15. R. Staples and W. Hudson, *An Ecological Survey of the Mountain Areas of Basutoland* (Morija: Morija Printing Works, 1938), 35–38; Patrick Duncan, *Sotho Laws and Customs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 74–79; Tim Quinlan, “Marena a Lesotho: Chiefs, Politics, and Culture in Lesotho” (PhD diss., University of Cape Town, 1994), 115; Molelekoa Mohapi, *Temo ea Boholo-holo Lesotho* (Morija: Morija Sesuto Book Depot, 1956); Stephen Turner, “Sesotho Farming: The Conditions and Prospects of Agriculture in the Lowlands and Foothills of Lesotho” (PhD diss., University of London, 1978), 100–105; Sheddick, *Land Tenure*, 78–80; Seleso Tsoako, interview with author, Jan. 17, 2015.

16. See George Masfield, *A History of the Colonial Agricultural Service* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 90–97; Joseph Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 61–71.

17. “The Agricultural Industry of the Orange Free State: The Rise and Growth of the Glenn School of Agriculture and Experiment Station,” *The Agricultural Journal of South Africa* 16 (1925): 1169–71; Transkeian Territories General Council, *Proceedings and Reports of Select Committees* (Umtata: Territorial News, 1909–1913, 1921–1922), 1909–1910, pp. 5–7; 1912–1913, pp. v–x; 1921–1922, pp. xxiii–xvi; see also Khan, “Rewriting South Africa’s Conservation History,” 508–9; Tischler, “Education and the Agrarian Question,” 255–64.

18. Saul Dubow, *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 170; Tischler, “Education and the Agrarian Question,” 266; on capitalism and subsistence, see Steven Stoll, “The Captured Garden: The Political Ecology of Subsistence under Capitalism,” *International Labor and Working-Class History* 85 (Spring 2014): 75–96.

19. Peter Sanders, *Mosboesboe: Chief of the Sotho* (London: Heinemann, 1975), 125–31.

20. For discussion of progress, see Marc Epprecht, “*This Matter of Women is Getting Very Bad*”: *Gender, Development and Politics in Colonial Lesotho* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000), 30–33; Patrick Harries, *Butterflies and Barbarians: Swiss Missionaries and Systems of Knowledge in South-East Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 46, 59, 221; on progress in agricultural and veterinary knowledge, see Mordechai Tamarkin, *Volk and Flock: Ecology, Identity, and Politics among Cape Afrikaners in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Pretoria:

UNISA Press, 2009), 14–21; on agricultural knowledge and experimentation, see Paul Richards, *Indigenous Agricultural Revolution: Ecology and Food Production in West Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).

21. P. H. Butterfield, “A History of Education in Lesotho,” *The Africa Institute* 41 (1977): 8–9; Jobo Moteane, reproduced in David Ambrose and Albert Brutsch, “Jobo Moteane’s Journey,” *Mehloli*, Pt. V (1991): 7.

22. Craig Hincks, *Quest for Peace: An Ecumenical History of the Church in Lesotho* (Morija: Morija Printing Works, 2009), 482–90; Epprecht, “*This Matter of Women Is Getting Very Bad*,” 30–33, 169–78. The Anglican Church also had a minor presence in the mountains by this time. See Reginald Dove, *Anglican Pioneers in Lesotho: Some Account of the Diocese of Lesotho, 1876–1930* (Maseru: Mazenod Institute, 1975), 162; Francois Mairiot, *Suivez le Guide S’il Vous Plait! A Tous Leurs Parents, Amis, et Bienfaiteurs en T moignage de Gratitude pour Cent Ans de Labeur Apostolique, 1862–1962* (Maseru: Mazenod Institute, 1962), 129–32; on Bernard Huss, see Francis Schimlek, *Against the Stream: Life of Father Bernard Huss, CMM, the Social Apostle of the Bantu* (Durban: Marianhill Mission Press, 1949), 43–49.

23. H. S. DuToit, *South Africa Drought Investigation Commission Interim Report* (Cape Town: Government Printers, 1922), 17–20, 29–30; Pim, *Financial and Economic*, 150; *Final Report of the Drought Investigation Commission* (Cape Town: Cape Times Limited, 1923), 204–6; High Commissioner (HC), South Africa, to RC of Basutoland, Oct. 12, 1911, S3/10/5/53, LNA; CAR 1911–1912, p. 6; CAR 1922, pp. 10–11.

24. Machobane, *Government and Change*, 76–82. The Resident Commissioner was the highest colonial official in the territory. Basutoland Proceedings of the National Council (Sessional Papers) 1916, CO 646, pp. 11–16, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, Richmond, UK (hereafter cited as TNA); BNC discussion on dipping, 1923, S3/1/6, LNA; CAR 1924, pp. 11–13; CAR 1930, p. 10.

25. “The Constitution of the Basutoland Progressive Association,” Nov. 28, 1907, General Collection, MMA; “Tsela ea ho Balehela Bofuma,” *Naledi Ea Lesotho*, June 20, 1924; “L. F. Chokobane,” *Naledi Ea Lesotho*, July 11, 1924.

26. For example, see Robert Trent Vinson, *The Americans Are Coming! Dreams of African American Liberation in Segregationist South Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Sven Beckert, “From Tuskegee to Togo: The Problem of Freedom in the Empire of Cotton,” *Journal of American History* 92, no. 2 (2005): 498–526.

27. Butterfield, “History of Education,” 8–9; CAR 1905–1906, pp. 61–64; Ferguson, “Caught in No Man’s Land,” 42–43; Hersey, *My Work Is That of Conservation*, 144–45.

28. Booker T. Washington, “A Farmer’s College on Wheels,” *The World’s Work* 13 (1906): 8352–54; Thomas Campbell, *The Movable School Goes to the Negro Farmer* (Tuskegee: Tuskegee Institute Press, 1936), 82–85.

29. Ferguson, “Caught in No Man’s Land,” 48; Hersey, *My Work Is That of Conservation*, 218; B. D. Mayberry, “The Tuskegee Movable School: A Unique Contribution to National and International Agriculture and Rural Development,” *Agricultural History* 65, no. 2 (1991): 85–104.

30. Alexander Kerr, *Fort Hare 1915–48: The Evolution of an African College* (London: C. Hurst, 1968), 48; “Excerpts from Brief Report of Conditions and Work of Rev. J. E. East and Wife, Missionaries to Middledrift, S. Africa,” *Mission Herald* 26 (1923): 17–21.

31. Kerr, *Fort Hare 1915–48*, 45; Khan, “Rewriting South Africa’s Conservation History,” 504–6.

32. “Rev. J. E. East Appointed,” *Imvo Zabantsundu*, Nov. 12, 1918; Paul Germond, “Note on the Development of the Farm and Agricultural Courses at Fort Hare,” in Kerr, *Fort Hare*

1915–48, pp. 265–70; Vinson, *The Americans Are Coming!*, 29–31; Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa*, 134; James East, “From the Field,” *Missionary Herald*, Jan. 1920.

33. GS to PEMS Chairman, Oct. 4, 1923, S3/1/1/6, LNA.

34. Wachter to Basutoland GS, Jan. 24, 1924; Wachter to GS, Apr. 7, 1924; Wachter to GS, June 6, 1924; and PC Griffith Lerotholi to GS, Aug. 18, 1924, all in S3/1/1/6, LNA.

35. “Improved Farming,” *Mochochonono*, Feb. 23, 1927; *Proceedings of the Basutoland National Council for 1927* (BNC) (Morija: Morija Printing Works, 1928), 42–50.

36. CAR 1924, p. 13. The initial £250 was out of a total agricultural budget of £1,200. Edwin Moletsane to GS, Oct. 4, 1924, and Wachter to GS, Nov. 25, 1927, both in S3/1/1/6, LNA; RDA 1960, pp. 113–14.

37. For example, in 1936 Magadlela delivered three lectures to a total of three hundred five attendees. See RDA 1936, pp. 11–13; Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Jan. 23, 2015; Wachter to GS, Nov. 25, 1927, S3/1/1/6, LNA; CAR 1926, pp. 7, 13; Lawrence Wachter, “Advice on Wheat Growing and Winter Ploughing,” *Naledi Ea Lesotho*, Apr. 9, 1926.

38. L. Wachter to GS, Nov. 25, 1927, S3/1/1/6, LNA; Sayce, “Ethno-Geographical Essay,” 277.

39. *Ibid.*, 274; RDA 1936, p. 25; Sheddick, *Land Tenure*, 78; RDA 1961, p. 18.

40. RDA 1936, pp. 23–25; Marapeli Raselepe, interview with author, Dec. 25, 2014. My comments on gardens are also based on observations and conversations during fieldwork.

41. Sayce, “Ethno-Geographical Essay,” 270–73; Staples and Hudson, *Ecological Survey*, 22–30; *BNC, 43rd Session, 1947, Vol. 2*, 546–48; *BNC, 48th Session, 1952, Vol. 2*, 559–63.

42. Wachter to GS, Nov. 25, 1927, S3/1/1/6, LNA; Wachter to GS, Apr. 4, 1929, S3/1/1/8, LNA.

43. G. Henderson, *A Survey of Our Sheep and Wool Industry* (Morija: Morija Printing Works, 1936), 1–5; CAR 1906–1907, p. 57; “Report of BNC Proceedings for 1926,” *Leselinyana la Lesotho*, Dec. 3, 1926; Christopher R. Conz, “Sheep, Scab Mites, and Society: The Process and Politics of Veterinary Knowledge in Lesotho, Southern Africa, c. 1900–1933,” *Environment and History*, Fast Track preprint, DOI 10.3197/096734018X15440029363690.

44. GS of Basutoland to SA Secretary of Agriculture, June 12, 1911, LSK S419, South African National Archives, Pretoria (hereafter cited as SAB); Principal Veterinary Surgeon (PVS) to GS, May 9, 1923, S3/1/7/7, LNA; Mochinti Jane, interview with author, May 18, 2015.

45. At the time of the 1936 census, 33 percent of men in Qacha’s Nek were absent; 40 percent were absent in 1956. *Basutoland Census for 1936* (Pretoria: Government Printers, 1937), 5; *Census for 1956*, 74; Sheddick, *Land Tenure*, 83–87.

46. Wachter to GS, Nov. 25, 1927, S3/1/1/6, LNA; CAR 1929, p. 10; CAR 1936, p. 22; Mamotlatsi Motjoli, interview with author, Jan. 2, 2015; Seleso Tsoako, interview with author, Jan. 19, 2015.

47. CAR 1933, p. 34–37; Pim, *Financial and Economic*, 140–43; Staples and Hudson, *Ecological Survey*, 35–37; on Basotho perspectives, see Chief Griffith Lerotholi to RC Richards, Mar. 30, 1936, FCO 141/872, TNA; Edward Mohapelo, “Khoholeho ea Mobu,” *Leselinyana la Lesotho*, Sept. 6, 1933; on the international context, see David Anderson, “Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought: The Colonial State and Soil Conservation in East Africa During the 1930s,” *African Affairs* 83, no. 332 (July 1984): 321–43.

48. CAR 1936, pp. 13–17; E. M. Palmer, “Basutoland—Heart of the Union,” *Veld Trust News*, June 1945; see also Thackwray Driver, “Anti-Erosion Policies in the Mountain Areas of Lesotho: The South African Connection,” *Environment and History* 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 1–25; Joanne Yawitch, *Betterment: The Myth of Homeland Agriculture* (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1981), 9–11.

49. Memorandum of principal discussed by the minister and secretary for native affairs, Nov.

12, 1935, and PC Griffith to RC, Mar. 30, 1936, both in FCO 141/872, TNA; RDA 1938, p. 62–70; Showers, *Imperial Gullies*, 177–84. State-led soil conservation policy, as well as its underlying science, implementation, and consequences, has generated substantial scholarship. We know that conservation science in the 1930s–1950s was imperfect, evolving, and sometimes ineffective. Furthermore, planners typically discounted local knowledge in carrying out these schemes. Not least, we know that some people refused to build and maintain these structures, or destroyed them for political or practical reasons. See Showers, *Imperial Gullies*; Pamela Maack, “We Don’t Want Terraces!': Protest and Identity under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme,” in *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*, eds. Gregory Maddox, James L. Giblin, Isaria N. Kimambo (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), 152–70; William Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Conservationism, and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900–1960,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 11, no. 1 (Oct. 1984): 52–83; Paul S. Sutter, *Let Us Now Praise Famous Gullies: Providence Canyon and the Soils of the South* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015).

50. Paramount Chief’s Order 1/26, Mar. 26, 1941, reproduced in Russell Thornton, “Anti-Erosion Measures and Reclamation of Eroded Land,” *Proceedings of the South African Society of Engineers* 40 (1942): 79–104; see also Thackwray Driver, “The Theory and Politics of Mountain Rangeland Conservation and Pastoral Development in Colonial Lesotho” (PhD diss., University of London, 1998), 174–75.

51. C. M. H. Morojele, *1960 Agricultural Census*, Pt. 5: *Land Classification and Farming Practices* (Maseru: Agricultural Department, 1963), 10–13.

52. Report on trek to enquire into lands being cultivated in Mphosong Valley, Leribe, Oct. 22, 1957, Folder 1037, Box 37/1, Leribe Collection (LC), National University of Lesotho Archives, Roma, Lesotho (hereafter cited as NUL); Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Jan. 7, 2015; Peter Millin, interview with author, Sept. 18, 2015; Showers, *Imperial Gullies*, 205, 215.

53. Robert Edgar, *Prophets with Honour: A Documentary History of Lekhotla la Bafo* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1988), 6–10, 19–22; Reuben Mekenye, “Re-Examination of the Lekhotla La Bafo’s Challenge to Imperialism in Lesotho, 1919–1966,” *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2, no. 10 (2012): 77–91.

54. Voluntary sheep and goat dipping was established long before 1923, but the Scab Act marked increased intervention to eradicate scab, a policy politicized and contested by some. Other than in exceptional circumstances, fatalities among dipped animals ranged between 1 percent in 1918 to 0.02 percent in 1932. See Maphutseng Lefela, “One Oppressor Less for Basutoland,” *Umsebenzi*, Nov. 30, 1929, reproduced in Edgar, *Prophets with Honour*, 151; Annual Dipping Returns 1914–15, Qacha’s Nek District, S3/1/6/5, LNA; Mr. Wilfred to Mr. Chaka, Feb. 24, 1918, S3/1/6/3, LNA; CAR 1932, pp. 11–12.

55. Watchman, “Forced Labour in Basutoland,” *Inkululeko*, Dec. 3, 1945, reproduced in Edgar, *Prophets with Honour*, 182.

56. L. Wachter, Quarterly Agricultural Report, Jan. 16, 1937, S/165 538 II, LNA; Report on Village Tree Planting, Mar. 3, 1943, Folder Tree Planting, 1936–1946, Box 37/2, LC, NUL; Russell Thornton, “A Review of 7 Years Work,” Feb. 23, 1942, DO 35/916/16, TNA.

57. RDA 1950, p. 7; RDA 1955, p. 26–27.

58. RDA 1946, p. 10; RDA 1951, p. 8–10; RDA 1959, p. 16–17; Marapeli Raselepe, interview with author, Dec. 25, 2014.

59. Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Sept. 24, 2008; on Chief Makhaola and agricultural programs, see RC, Basutoland to Secretary of Native Affairs, Dec. 4, 1931, Vol. 10163, Ref. 52/419, NTS, SAB.

60. See Fort Cox Bursary Students Reports, 1942–1943, File 107/327, NTS 7329, SAB; Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Jan. 7, 2015; Khan, “Rewriting South Africa’s Con-

servation History,” 509.

61. Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Jan. 7, 2015; Tseliso Ramakhula, interview with author, Nov. 14, 2014. For an elaboration of this debate in South African politics, see Vinson, *The Americans Are Coming!*, 82–95; Diploma Students, Dec. 1952, 154/327, NTS, SAB; Tseliso Ramakhula, interview with author, Nov. 14, 2014.

62. Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Jan. 7, 2015; David Theko Makhaola, “Improvement of Pastures, Anti-Soil Erosion Work, Planting of Forests and Agriculture in General,” *Basutoland Farmer’s Journal* 2, no. 1 (1956): v–vii.

63. Mokhafisi Kena, interview with author, Jan. 7, 2015; RDA 1951, p. 3; *Basutoland Annual Report by the Director of Education for 1954* (Morija: Morija Printing Works, 1955), 3; on nutrition science and soil erosion, see Diana Wylie, *Starving on a Full Stomach: Hunger and the Triumph of Cultural Racism in Modern South Africa* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 145–48.

64. Seleso Tsoako, interview with author, Jan. 19, 2015.

65. Ibid; on language and translation, see Diana Jeater, *Law, Language, and Science: The Invention of the “Native Mind” in Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1930* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2007), 6–10; on Sesotho agricultural terms, see M. Sharpe, *Everyday Sesotho Grammar* (Morija: Morija Book Depot 1970), 119.

66. Mamahlomola Makhaola, interview with author, May 27, 2015; see also Sheddick, *Land Tenure*, 78–79.

67. Ibid; Mapoloko Ramatseka, interview with author, June 2, 2015; Matumisang Khalala, interview with author, May 27, 2015; Maleseko Kena, interview with author, May 19, 2015; on the Homemakers Association, see Epprecht, “*This Matter of Women Is Getting Very Bad*,” 176–77; Aerni-Flessner, “Development, Politics, and the Centralization of State Power,” 407.

68. John Lonsdale and D. Low, “Introduction: Towards the New Order, 1945–1963,” in *The Oxford History of East Africa*, vol. III, ed. D. Low and Alison Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 12–16.

69. RDA 1951, p. 12; RDA 1953, pp. 17–19.

70. MMA, “Pilot Project, Teyateyaneng, Basutoland,” no. 10, Dec. 1956; Wallman, *Take out Hunger*, 94–95, 132–33.

71. See Green, “Labor Costs and the Failed Support”; Siegel, “Modernizing Peasants and Master Farmers”; RDA 1958, pp. 15–16.

72. RDA 1958, pp. 5–9; RDA 1960, pp. 4–7; Morojele, *1960 Agricultural Census*, Pt. 3: *Agricultural Holdings*, 28.

73. Morojele, *1960 Agricultural Census of Basutoland*, Pt. 1: *Census Methodology*, 16.

74. Marapeli Raselepe, interview with author, Dec. 25, 2014; Mokhabi Lesoli, interview with author, Jan. 13, 2015; Mpolokeng Putsoane, interview with author, Jan. 20, 2015. Farmers used mechanical planters to save labor and to space seeds consistently and at uniform depth. Most farmers in Qacha’s Nek, then and now, plant by hand, dropping seeds in furrows and then plowing in the seeds. The extent to which hand planting is preferred regardless of access to planters is not clear.

75. James Machobane and Robert Berold, *Drive out Hunger: The Story of J. J. Machobane of Lesotho* (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2003); A. F. Robertson, “Popular Scientist: James Jacob Machobane and Mantsa Tlala,” *African Affairs* 93, no. 370 (Jan. 1994): 99–121; J. J. Machobane, “The Machobane Mass Agricultural College and Development Foundation College, Mants’a Tlala, Basutoland,” unpublished prospectus, April 5, 1961, MMA.

76. Machobane and Berold, *Drive -- Hunger*; Stephen Ralits’oele, interview with author, June 11, 2015.

77. RDA 1957, p. 18; CAR 1965, pp. 24–27; See also D. S. Uys, *The Lesotho Mohair Industry*:

History and Evaluation (Port Elizabeth: Mohair Board, 1971).

78. Hodge, *Triumph of the Expert*, 207–9, 230–36.

79. Yawitch, *Betterment*, 14–26; Showers, *Imperial Gullies*, 242–44.

80. Richard F. Weisfelder, *Political Contention in Lesotho: 1952–1965* (Roma: Institute of International Studies, 1999), 2–5, 24–27.

81. Mutimba, “Reflections on Agricultural Extension and Extension Policy in Africa.”

82. For example, see Akhil Gupta, *Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998).